



The Center for
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Electoral College Reform in Michigan

Written Testimony by FairVote executive director Rob Richie on H.B. 5974
Committee on Elections and Ethics Hearing, Tuesday, December 2, 2014

Introduction: Thank you to the committee for my opportunity to provide written testimony on HB 5974. As a critic of both HB 5974 and Michigan's current law for allocating Electoral College votes, I testify to provide information on four topics that are relevant to HB 5974:

- ***Michigan's unlikely battleground status:*** Michigan has a slim chance of being a 2016 battleground state. It is more likely to receive less general election attention from the major candidates than warranted by its population, as was also true in 2008 and 2012.
- ***Impact of HB 5974 rule being used only in Michigan:*** If HB 5974 were law in Michigan in 2016, the state would at most have four electoral votes in play and more likely only two. At least eight other states would more electoral votes in play. At the same time, there is a plausible scenario where HB 5974 could convert a 275-263 Democratic win in the Electoral College into a 269-269 tie, leaving Congress to pick the president.
- ***Impact of HB 5974 rule being used in all states:***
 - ***Nearly all small states ignored:*** If the HB 5974 electoral vote allocation method had been used in all states in 2012, 24 states (including DC) would not had a single electoral vote in play, including fully 14 of the nation's smallest 15 states.
 - ***Lack of symmetry in comparable popular vote outcomes:*** Barack Obama's 52% to 48% win in the two-party vote would have translated into an electoral vote win of 287 to 251. Simulating a 52% to 48% popular vote win for Mitt Romney shows that Romney would have won by a far larger electoral vote margin of 315 to 223.
 - ***Potential of popular vote winner being defeated:*** Simulating a national popular vote tie results in a Romney win by 271 to 267, suggesting that this system would likely would have allowed Romney to win even if losing in the popular vote.
- ***Contrasting HB 5974 with the National Popular Vote interstate compact and current winner-take-all rule:*** The best way to treat all states and all voters fairly is to join 10 states and District of Columbia in entering the National Popular Vote interstate compact. To underscore this point, I critique last month's testimony by the League of Women Voters of Michigan that defended the winner-take-all rule.

As background, I have been executive director of FairVote – The Center for Voting and Democracy since 1992. FairVote is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization governed by the principle that a representative democracy should respect every vote. With a history of working cooperatively with civic leaders and policymakers from across the spectrum, we pursue research, outreach and education in order to promote the goal of all Americans having a fair chance to cast

a meaningful vote and elect representatives. My writings have appeared in every major newspaper in the United States and in nine books, including as co-author of *Every Vote Equal* about presidential elections and *Whose Votes Count* about alternative voting methods. I recently coauthored a lengthy scholarly article for *Presidential Studies Quarterly* on the 2012 election.¹

(1) Michigan is unlikely to be a battleground state in the 2016 presidential elections:

A battleground state is a state that receives more campaign attention than merited by its population size. To gauge a state's battleground status, FairVote has developed the Attention Index,² which scores each state based on a comparison of how that state's share of the nation's eligible voters compares to its share of campaign attention, as measured by major party ticket campaign events and campaign spending after the parties' conventions. Michigan was a battleground state in 2004, but was not a battleground state in 2008 and 2012. In 2012, Michigan's 2012 Attention Index score was 0.33, meaning that it received only a third of the campaign attention (in terms of ads and campaign events) that was merited by its population.

FairVote projects that Michigan is more likely to be a spectator state than a swing state in the 2016 presidential election. Campaigns target states based on whether they determine that campaign activity might make the difference between winning and losing the state. Even though Republican nominee Mitt Romney's father had been a three-term governor of Michigan and even though neither Barack Obama nor Joe Biden campaigned in the state after the conventions, Obama won by a comfortable margin of 9.5%. The Democratic nominee has won the state for six consecutive presidential elections, with margins ranging from a low of 3.4% to a high of 16.4%.

"Swing states" are states that have a partisanship balance between 47% and 53%.³ In 2012, Michigan's partisanship was 53.04%, falling outside of the range of partisanship that would make Michigan a "swing state." Furthermore, its 53.04% partisanship puts it even farther from being a "tipping point state" -- that is, a state where its outcome has the potential to change the

¹ See *How the 2012 Presidential Election Has Strengthened the Movement for the National Popular Vote Plan* at <http://www.fairvote.org/assets/Uploads/RichieLevien-PSQ-article.pdf>

² Our Attention Index measures campaign attention using expenses on TV advertisements and the number of campaign events that occur in the state. If a state receives the amount of attention it deserves, it will receive an Attention Index score of one. If it receives less attention than deserved, it will receive a score of zero to one, making it a spectator state. If it receives more attention than deserved, it will receive a score greater than one, making it a battleground state. In 2012, 35 states received less than one-hundredth of the campaign attention warranted by their population.

³ Partisanship is based on percentage that the Democratic and Republican candidates won, relative to the national outcomes. Because Libertarian Gary Johnson was not on the Michigan ballot in 2012, we rely on the Democratic-centric partisanship for Michigan, looking at how well the Democratic candidate did. Obama won 54.04% of Michigan, 3.04% more than he won nationwide. Thus, the Democratic partisanship was 53.04%. The Republican partisanship is always 100% minus the Democratic partisanship.

The Democratic-centric partisanship is also preferable in Michigan's case. The Libertarian candidate, Gary Johnson, appeared on all states' ballots except in Michigan and Oklahoma, likely pulling away Republican votes in all states except for those two. For this reason, we expect Michigan's Republican partisanship to be slightly inflated above the national average. The Democratic-centric partisanship avoids this source of error.

overall election outcome. Instead, a Republican victory in Michigan in 2016 almost certainly would come only when the Republican nominee has won an electoral vote landslide.

The Democratic-leaning swing states, in order of partisanship (from closest-to-even balance to more strongly Democratic), are as follows: Virginia, Colorado, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, Iowa, Nevada, Wisconsin, and Minnesota. Although all these states lean Democratic, they are all less Democratic than Michigan – even Minnesota, which has not been won by a Republican nominee since Richard Nixon's landslide in 1972.

To win the presidency in 2016, Republicans need only win all the states that lean Republican in their partisanship and only one of the Democratic-leaning states (two of those states if one of those states is New Hampshire). Republicans have far more inviting targets than a state that Democrats have won in every election since 1988 and won by an average of 13 percentage points in presidential elections in 2008 and 2012.

As a result, under current Electoral College rules it is unlikely that Michigan will draw significant campaign attention in 2016. Indeed, depending on the outcome in the state in 2016, Michigan could quite possibly move to join the 35 states that received Attention Index measures of 0.01 or less in 2012 – that is, states that received less than a hundredth of the attention warranted by their population size. Take Missouri for example, which once was a true swing state, but in 2012 had an attention index of 0.00.

(2) HB 5974's impact on Michigan's position in presidential elections.

As this testimony demonstrates, the current electoral system leaves Michigan relatively unimportant in the eyes of presidential campaigns – and on the cusp of joining the majority of states that are completely ignored in modern presidential elections. While the Electoral College vote allocation rule in HB 5974 is novel in how it seeks to reward political activity in states that are not close in the statewide vote, it would be unlikely to improve Michigan's relevance in presidential elections.

HB 5974 proposes a new formula for allocating electoral votes. Rather than having the winner of the statewide popular vote win all of Michigan's electoral votes, victory in the state would mean winning one more than half of the state's electoral votes, meaning nine of Michigan's 16 electoral votes. The candidate would then win an additional electoral vote for every 1.5% won above 50% of the two-party statewide vote. The second-place finisher would win the rest of the state's electoral votes.

In 2012, for example, Barack Obama won 54.8% of the two-party statewide vote, with Mitt Romney winning 45.2%. Obama would have won nine electoral votes for winning the statewide vote and an additional three electoral votes for winning 4.8% above 50% of the two-party vote (one electoral vote for each 1.5% raise in his vote share).⁴ Obama's total number of electoral votes therefore would have been 12, and Romney would have been awarded the remaining four electoral votes for being the second-place winner.

⁴ Obama needed 4.5% to win the three electoral votes. He would have needed 6% to win four electoral votes.

This plan succeeds in representing voters from both of the major two parties in the state. However, it still leaves Michigan with a smaller number of swing electoral votes than at least eight other states. FairVote calculated swing votes for this plan based on how many electoral votes could possibly change if Obama had won or lost three percentage points of the two-party statewide vote – with three percentage points being a very generous definition of what might be affected by campaign activity. If Obama's share of the vote had declined by three percentage points, his two-party vote percentage in Michigan would have been 51.8%, and he would have won 10 electoral votes, a net loss of two. If Obama had increased his share of the vote by three percentage points, his two-party vote percentage would have been 57.8%, and his final electoral vote count would have been 14, a net gain of two electoral votes. In total, Michigan would have had at most four swing votes under this plan even assuming unrealistically that campaign activity could result in a shift of three percentage points in either direction.

If Michigan alone adopts this system of allocating electoral votes, it would find itself among "swing states" – but with at most four electoral votes in play and more realistically only two. As a result, the usual swing states would continue to overshadow Michigan. Nine swing states would continue to have more swing electoral votes than Michigan's two. Those states would include Florida (29), Pennsylvania (29), Ohio (18), North Carolina (15), Virginia (13), Minnesota (10), Wisconsin (10), Colorado (9), Nevada (6), Iowa (6) and New Hampshire (4).

Despite this fact, there are scenarios where HB 5974 could make Michigan a "tipping point state" in 2016. For instance, if you sum the electoral votes in the 19 states that Democrats have won six straight times, Democrats start a close presidential election with a relatively strong base of 242 electoral votes. If you add Florida's 29 electoral votes to that total, it grows to a winning majority of 271 electoral votes. If Democrats also won New Hampshire for the fourth straight time, they would have 275 electoral votes.

But suppose HB 5974 were law and the Republican nominee were able to win 47.1% of the two-party vote in Michigan, under H.B. 5874 the Republican would win six electoral votes – and suddenly go from losing the presidency by 12 electoral votes to earning a 269-269 electoral vote tie and having the Republican-run House of Representatives pick the president. Although the odds of this scenario or a similar scenario involving more states are low, they are plausible if the 2016 presidential election were nationally very close.

(3) How HB 5974 rules work if applied nationally,

FairVote assessed what the hypothetical outcomes would have been if HB 5974 had been applied nationwide in the 2012 presidential elections. In 2012, Obama would have won 287 electoral votes (53.3% of electoral votes), and Romney would have won 251 (46.7% of electoral votes). This Electoral College outcome would be far closer to the national popular vote, which Obama won by four percentage points, than the actual electoral vote split of 62% to 38%.

But presidential elections are more about electing presidents than about electing members of the Electoral College. Margins in the Electoral College are far less relevant than who wins and loses – and how candidates campaign in their efforts to win. And here, the rules of HB 5974 fall short, especially when contrasted with better alternatives.

First, the candidate with the most popular votes in all 50 states and the District of Columbia might lose the election. Even if electoral vote percentage skews will be lessened, that most fundamental skew of a “wrong way winner” remains possible. Our simulation of a tied vote in the 2012 presidential election indicates that Mitt Romney would have won – and still would have won even if Barack Obama had won a narrow victory in the popular vote.

Second, in our simulation of the rule in 2012, nearly half of states – 24 in all, with a total population of more than 50 million people (and more than 41 million eligible voters) – would have remained spectator states. They would have had zero swing votes, making them as irrelevant in the eyes of presidential campaigns as they are today.

The states without swing votes tend to be small in population. In the 24 states that would not have any swing votes in our simulation, the median number of electoral votes is 4.5. Of our nation’s 15 smallest population states (including the District of Columbia), 14 would have lacked even a single swing electoral vote. In the two states with the maximum of five swing votes, Pennsylvania and Ohio, the median number of electoral votes is 19, nearly two and a half times the national median of eight electoral votes.

The reason that the proposed legislation would disadvantage small population states is that it would be much harder for trailing candidates to win a single electoral vote. In states with three electoral votes, a candidate would need to win 48.5% of the two-party statewide vote in order to win one electoral vote. In states with four electoral votes, a candidate would need to win 47% of the two-party vote – meaning that the state would need to be a swing state in a nationally competitive year. In large states, trailing candidates would have much easier access to winning a single electoral vote. For example, a candidate would have to win only 23% of the two-party vote to win an electoral vote in Texas and only 9.5% to win an electoral vote in California.

In short, the Michigan plan, if applied nationwide, would continue to skew the amount of attention a state would receive. Nearly half of all states would remain spectator states, and the millions of people living within those states would remain unable to influence the outcomes of presidential elections.

Simulations of statewide applications of HB 5974 demonstrate potential of partisan bias: To test the impact of HB 5974 if its electoral vote formula were used in all states, we conducted two additional simulations. The simulations demonstrate that HB 5974 could distort election results.

In the first such simulation, we looked at the hypothetical result of Obama and Romney tying at 50% of the two-party vote nationwide. In 2012, Obama won the two-party vote nationwide by nearly four percentage points, so for each state, we subtracted 1.97% from Obama’s two-party percentage and added 1.97% to Romney’s two-party percentage. In total, Obama would then have won 267 electoral votes, and Romney would have won 271 electoral votes, meaning that Romney would have won such a tied election. While these Electoral College results are close, they indicate that it is likely that one side would have had a slight advantage and be able to win the presidency despite a loss in the popular vote.

In the second additional simulation, we looked at the hypothetical results if Obama’s and Romney’s two-party percentages had been switched in 2012, meaning that Romney would have won by nearly four percentage points. For each state, we subtracted 3.93% from Obama’s two-

party percentage and added 3.93% to Romney's two-party percentage. With Romney winning by the exact same margin as earned by Obama in 2012, Romney would have won 315 electoral votes and Obama would have won only 223 electoral votes. This contrasts with the hypothetical results under Obama's and Romney's actual two-party win percentages in 2012 in which Obama won by 287 electoral votes to 251 electoral votes.

In short, the proposed Michigan plan suffers from bias. This bias is not as severe as the bias if all states allocated electoral votes by congressional district – a system that would have comfortably elected Romney in 2012 despite his loss by four percentage points in the popular vote – but it clearly exists. As occurs with most formulas for distributing state's electoral votes, the final electoral vote winner might not be the national popular preference for candidates.

(4) Why the national popular vote interstate compact is the best Electoral College reform and why Michigan's winner-take-all rule should not be defended

FairVote agrees that the current system for allocating electoral votes is flawed and that Michigan is not receiving the attention it deserves from presidential campaigns. But voters deserve a plan that allows every vote in every state to matter equally. FairVote supports adopting a national popular vote for president through state legislation.

States have the power to establish a national popular vote for president. Coming in the form of a binding agreement among states that enact it, the national popular vote interstate compact is designed to guarantee that the president elect wins the most votes in all 50 states and the District of Columbia.⁵ Ten states and D.C. have approved the plan, with a total of 165 electoral votes. Once passed in states with a majority of electoral votes, or 270 electoral votes total, the agreement is activated for the next presidential election.

The national popular vote plan would increase the fairness of elections nationwide. All voters in all states would have the potential to shape the outcome equally, and no voter would have unfair influence based on where he or she lives. Because candidates would have to appeal to voters nationwide, they would compete across the nation, not just in a few swing states.

Moreover, the national popular vote plan would specifically benefit Michigan. Michigan would receive the campaign attention it deserves based on its population, not its "swing state" status or its partisanship relative to other states.

Responding to defenses of the winner-take-all rule: Despite sharing some of the concerns about HB 5974 expressed by its opponents, we do not defend the current system for allocating electoral votes and wish to correct the record on certain points. For example, Sue Smith, the president of the League of Women Voters of Michigan, testified last month against HB 5974. I would like to make four points in response to her defense of Michigan having a winner-take-all voting rule.

First, Michigan has not exclusively used a winner-take-all rule for allocating electoral votes on a continuous basis since its first presidential election in 1836. Michigan, in fact, allocated electoral votes by congressional district in 1892.

⁵ See the website of the National Popular Vote organization for more information: NationalPopularVote.com

Regardless historical precedent is not a sufficient justification for Michigan's winner-take-all rule for allocating electoral votes. The implication that a statewide winner-take-all rule is the "right" method for allocating electoral votes is contradicted by the fact that our original 13 states used a wide range of methods during the nation's early decades. Some of our nation's finest constitutional thinkers, such as James Madison, were highly critical of the statewide winner-take-all rule. In an 1823 letter, Madison in fact backed a constitutional amendment that would have prohibited the winner-take all rule.⁶ States settled on the winner-take-all rule primarily for partisan and parochial interests, not the national interest.

Second, having a winner-take-all rule is no guarantee of campaigns giving attention to Michigan's voters and "unique issues, such as the auto industry and the Great Lakes." As detailed earlier, Michigan already is earning less attention from candidates than its population warrants and, if the current system is not reformed, is on the cusp of joining the 35 states that consistently get no attention whatsoever in presidential elections.

Third, the Constitution clearly delegates to state legislators the power to allocate electoral votes, and states repeatedly have used that power over the years. Never once has a change in how a state allocates electoral votes been done by a referendum, as proposed by Sue Smith. While such a method to changing electoral votes would be legal, it is certainly not necessary.

Fourth, the answer to the problem of today's presidential election system is not to defend the winner-take all rule, but instead to support a national popular vote for president. Indeed, the League of Women Voters of the United States in 2010 adopted a position in favor of the National Popular Vote plan, and in several states, state Leagues have been at the forefront of efforts to adopt the plan.

Conclusion

FairVote's analysis demonstrates the shortcomings with HB 5974, the proposed legislation to change how electoral votes are allocated. If applied in Michigan alone, HB 5974 would be unlikely to lead to Michigan earning the attention it deserves. If its electoral vote formula were applied nationwide, HB 5974 would allow a "wrong way winner" who has lost the popular vote and would leave many states (including 14 of our 15 smallest population states) without any swing electoral votes, resulting in campaigns continuing to ignore them entirely. The proposal therefore fails to solve the problems with the current Electoral College system.

What we need is a presidential election system that results in competition in all corners of the nation, makes all voters equally relevant, and ensures election of the candidate who best reflects the popular will. I urge the committee to give serious consideration to the adoption of the plan that best achieves these goals: the national popular vote plan for president.

⁶ McCarthy, "How the Electoral College Became Winner-Take-All," *FairVote Blog*, 22 Aug. 2012, Online at: <http://www.fairvote.org/research-and-analysis/blog/how-the-electoral-college-became-winner-take-all/>.

2012 SIMULATION OF MICHIGAN ELECTORAL COLLEGE PROPOSAL

2012 Electoral Vote Results

Romney Total	251	46.65%
Obama Total	287	53.35%

Swing Votes under Michigan Plan:	90
# of States with no swing votes, MI plan:	24

State	Total Vote	Democratic Raw Vote	Republican Raw Vote	Democratic Raw Vote %	Republican Raw Vote %	2-party D %
USA TOTAL		65,918,507	60,934,407			51.96%
Wyoming	249,061	69,286	170,962	27.82%	68.64%	28.84%
Dist. of Columbia	293,764	267,070	21,381	90.91%	7.28%	92.59%
Vermont	299,290	199,239	92,698	66.57%	30.97%	68.25%
Alaska	300,495	122,640	164,676	40.81%	54.80%	42.68%
North Dakota	322,627	124,827	188,163	38.69%	58.32%	39.88%
South Dakota	363,815	145,039	210,610	39.87%	57.89%	40.78%
Delaware	413,921	242,584	165,484	58.61%	39.98%	59.45%
Hawaii	434,697	306,658	121,015	70.55%	27.84%	71.70%
Rhode Island	446,049	279,677	157,204	62.70%	35.24%	64.02%
Montana	484,484	201,839	267,928	41.66%	55.30%	42.97%
Idaho	656,742	212,787	420,911	32.40%	64.09%	33.58%
West Virginia	672,119	238,269	417,655	35.45%	62.14%	36.33%
New Hampshire	710,972	369,561	329,918	51.98%	46.40%	52.83%
Maine	713,180	401,306	292,276	56.27%	40.98%	57.86%
New Mexico	783,757	415,335	335,788	52.99%	42.84%	55.30%
Nebraska	794,379	302,081	475,064	38.03%	59.80%	38.87%
Nevada	1,014,918	531,373	463,567	52.36%	45.68%	53.41%
Utah	1,020,861	251,813	740,600	24.67%	72.55%	25.37%
Arkansas	1,069,468	394,409	647,744	36.88%	60.57%	37.85%
Kansas	1,156,254	439,908	689,809	38.05%	59.66%	38.94%
Mississippi	1,285,584	562,949	710,746	43.79%	55.29%	44.20%
Oklahoma	1,334,872	443,547	891,325	33.23%	66.77%	33.23%
Connecticut	1,558,993	905,109	634,899	58.06%	40.72%	58.77%
Iowa	1,582,180	822,544	730,617	51.99%	46.18%	52.96%
Oregon	1,789,270	970,488	754,175	54.24%	42.15%	56.27%
Kentucky	1,798,048	679,370	1,087,190	37.78%	60.47%	38.46%
South Carolina	1,964,118	865,941	1,071,645	44.09%	54.56%	44.69%
Louisiana	1,994,065	809,141	1,152,262	40.58%	57.78%	41.25%

Alabama	2,074,338	795,696	1,255,925	38.36%	60.55%	38.78%
Arizona	2,306,559	1,025,232	1,233,654	44.45%	53.48%	45.39%
Tennessee	2,460,904	960,709	1,462,330	39.04%	59.42%	39.65%
Colorado	2,571,846	1,323,102	1,185,243	51.45%	46.09%	52.75%
Indiana	2,633,143	1,154,275	1,422,872	43.84%	54.04%	44.79%
Maryland	2,707,327	1,677,844	971,869	61.97%	35.90%	63.32%
Missouri	2,763,689	1,223,796	1,482,440	44.28%	53.64%	45.22%
Minnesota	2,936,561	1,546,167	1,320,225	52.65%	44.96%	53.94%
Wisconsin	3,068,434	1,620,985	1,407,966	52.83%	45.89%	53.52%
Washington	3,145,958	1,755,396	1,290,670	55.80%	41.03%	57.63%
Massachusetts	3,167,767	1,921,761	1,188,460	60.67%	37.52%	61.79%
New Jersey	3,651,140	2,126,610	1,478,749	58.25%	40.50%	58.98%
Virginia	3,854,489	1,971,820	1,822,522	51.16%	47.28%	51.97%
Georgia	3,908,369	1,773,827	2,078,688	45.39%	53.19%	46.04%
North Carolina	4,505,372	2,178,391	2,270,395	48.35%	50.39%	48.97%
Michigan	4,745,316	2,564,569	2,115,256	54.04%	44.58%	54.80%
Illinois	5,251,432	3,019,512	2,135,216	57.50%	40.66%	58.58%
Ohio	5,590,934	2,827,709	2,661,437	50.58%	47.60%	51.51%
Pennsylvania	5,754,939	2,990,274	2,680,434	51.96%	46.58%	52.73%
New York	7,081,536	4,485,877	2,490,496	63.35%	35.17%	64.30%
Texas	7,999,532	3,308,124	4,569,843	41.35%	57.13%	41.99%
Florida	8,492,175	4,237,756	4,163,447	49.90%	49.03%	50.44%
California	13,055,815	7,854,285	4,839,958	60.16%	37.07%	61.87%

Average Electoral Votes for States with 0 Swing Vote
Average Electoral Votes for States with 5 Swing Vote
Average Electoral Votes for All States

2012: Actual Results

2-party R %	Electoral Votes	2-party Winning Percentage	Electoral Votes for Wining State	Electoral Votes Earned for each 1.5% over 50.0%	Democrats Electoral Votes, Michigan Plan in 2012	Republicans' Electoral Votes, Michigan Plan in 2012	D Vote -3% of 2-party vote
48.04%	538		307	124	287	251	
71.16%	3	71.16%	2	1	0	3	62,079
7.41%	3	92.59%	2	1	3	0	258,416
31.75%	3	68.25%	2	1	3	0	190,481
57.32%	3	57.32%	2	1	0	3	114,021
60.12%	3	60.12%	2	1	0	3	115,437
59.22%	3	59.22%	2	1	0	3	134,370
40.55%	3	59.45%	2	1	3	0	230,342
28.30%	4	71.70%	3	1	4	0	293,828
35.98%	4	64.02%	3	1	4	0	266,571
57.03%	3	57.03%	2	1	0	3	187,746
66.42%	4	66.42%	3	1	0	4	193,776
63.67%	5	63.67%	3	2	0	5	218,591
47.17%	4	52.83%	3	1	4	0	348,577
42.14%	4	57.86%	3	1	4	0	380,499
44.70%	5	55.30%	3	2	5	0	392,801
61.13%	5	61.13%	3	2	0	5	278,767
46.59%	6	53.41%	4	2	6	0	501,525
74.63%	6	74.63%	4	2	0	6	222,041
62.15%	6	62.15%	4	2	0	6	363,144
61.06%	6	61.06%	4	2	0	6	406,016
55.80%	6	55.80%	4	2	0	6	524,738
66.77%	7	66.77%	4	3	0	7	403,501
41.23%	7	58.77%	4	3	7	0	858,909
47.04%	6	52.96%	4	1	5	1	775,949
43.73%	7	56.27%	4	3	7	0	918,748
61.54%	8	61.54%	5	3	0	8	626,373
55.31%	9	55.31%	5	3	1	8	807,813
58.75%	8	58.75%	5	3	0	8	750,299

61.22%	9	61.22%	5	4	0	9	734,147
54.61%	11	54.61%	6	3	2	9	957,465
60.35%	11	60.35%	6	5	0	11	888,018
47.25%	9	52.75%	5	1	6	3	1,247,852
55.21%	11	55.21%	6	3	2	9	1,076,961
36.68%	10	63.32%	6	4	10	0	1,598,353
54.78%	10	54.78%	6	3	1	9	1,142,609
46.06%	10	53.94%	6	2	8	2	1,460,175
46.48%	10	53.52%	6	2	8	2	1,530,116
42.37%	12	57.63%	7	5	12	0	1,664,014
38.21%	11	61.79%	6	5	11	0	1,828,454
41.02%	14	58.98%	8	5	13	1	2,018,449
48.03%	13	51.97%	7	1	8	5	1,857,990
53.96%	16	53.96%	9	2	5	11	1,658,252
51.03%	15	51.03%	8	0	7	8	2,044,927
45.20%	16	54.80%	9	3	12	4	2,424,174
41.42%	20	58.58%	11	5	16	4	2,864,870
48.49%	18	51.51%	10	1	11	7	2,663,035
47.27%	20	52.73%	11	1	12	8	2,820,153
35.70%	29	64.30%	15	9	24	5	4,276,586
58.01%	38	58.01%	20	5	13	25	3,071,785
49.56%	29	50.44%	15	0	15	14	3,985,720
38.13%	55	61.87%	28	7	35	20	7,473,458

es	5.3	Median Electoral Votes fo
ps	19.0	Median Electoral Votes fo
	10.6	Median Electoral Votes fo

Simulation: Obama down 3%, Romney up 3%

R Vote +3% of the 2-party vote	D Votes, 2- party -3%	R Votes, 2- party +3%	Actual electoral votes for each 1.5% over 50.0%	Democrats' Electoral Votes	GOP Electoral Votes	How many votes would D's lose and R's gain?	D Vote +3% of 2- party vote
			111	237	301	50	
178,169	25.84%	74.16%	1	0	3	0	76,493
30,035	89.59%	10.41%	1	3	0	0	275,724
101,456	65.25%	34.75%	1	3	0	0	207,997
173,295	39.68%	60.32%	1	0	3	0	131,259
197,553	36.88%	63.12%	1	0	3	0	134,217
221,279	37.78%	62.22%	1	0	3	0	155,708
177,726	56.45%	43.55%	1	3	0	0	254,826
133,845	68.70%	31.30%	1	4	0	0	319,488
170,310	61.02%	38.98%	1	4	0	0	292,783
282,021	39.97%	60.03%	1	0	3	0	215,932
439,922	30.58%	69.42%	1	0	4	0	231,798
437,333	33.33%	66.67%	2	0	5	0	257,947
350,902	49.83%	50.17%	0	1	3	3	390,545
313,083	54.86%	45.14%	1	4	0	0	422,113
358,322	52.30%	47.70%	1	4	1	1	437,869
498,378	35.87%	64.13%	2	0	5	0	325,395
493,415	50.41%	49.59%	0	4	2	2	561,221
770,372	22.37%	77.63%	2	0	6	0	281,585
679,009	34.85%	65.15%	2	0	6	0	425,674
723,701	35.94%	64.06%	2	0	6	0	473,800
748,957	41.20%	58.80%	2	0	6	0	601,160
931,371	30.23%	69.77%	3	0	7	0	483,593
681,099	55.77%	44.23%	3	7	0	0	951,309
777,212	49.96%	50.04%	0	2	4	3	869,139
805,915	53.27%	46.73%	2	6	1	1	1,022,228
1,140,187	35.46%	64.54%	3	0	8	0	732,367
1,129,773	41.69%	58.31%	4	0	9	1	924,069
1,211,104	38.25%	61.75%	3	0	8	0	867,983

1,317,474	35.78%	64.22%	4	0	9	0	857,245
1,301,421	42.39%	57.61%	5	0	11	2	1,092,999
1,535,021	36.65%	63.35%	5	0	11	0	1,033,400
1,260,493	49.75%	50.25%	0	4	5	2	1,398,352
1,500,186	41.79%	58.21%	5	0	11	2	1,231,589
1,051,360	60.32%	39.68%	4	10	0	0	1,757,335
1,563,627	42.22%	57.78%	4	0	10	1	1,304,983
1,406,217	50.94%	49.06%	0	6	4	2	1,632,159
1,498,835	50.52%	49.48%	0	6	4	2	1,711,854
1,382,052	54.63%	45.37%	3	10	2	2	1,846,778
1,281,767	58.79%	41.21%	5	11	0	0	2,015,068
1,586,910	55.98%	44.02%	3	11	3	2	2,234,771
1,936,352	48.97%	51.03%	0	6	7	2	2,085,650
2,194,263	43.04%	56.96%	4	3	13	2	1,889,402
2,403,859	45.97%	54.03%	2	5	10	2	2,311,855
2,255,651	51.80%	48.20%	1	10	6	2	2,704,964
2,289,858	55.58%	44.42%	3	14	6	2	3,174,154
2,826,111	48.51%	51.49%	0	8	10	3	2,992,383
2,850,555	49.73%	50.27%	0	9	11	3	3,160,395
2,699,787	61.30%	38.70%	7	22	7	2	4,695,168
4,806,182	38.99%	61.01%	7	11	27	2	3,544,463
4,415,483	47.44%	52.56%	1	13	16	2	4,489,792
5,220,785	58.87%	41.13%	5	33	22	2	8,235,112

or States with 0 Swing Votes	4.5
or States with 5 Swing Votes	19
or All States	8

Simulation: Obama up 3%, Romney down 3%

Swing Votes

R Vote -3% of the 2-party vote	D Votes , 2- party +3%	R Votes, 2- party 3%	Actual electoral votes for each 1.5% over 50.0%	Democrats EV	Republicans EV	How many votes would D win and R lose?	Total Swing (Down & Up) Votes	Percentage of Electoral Votes to Swing
			135	327	211	40	90	
163,755	31.84%	68.16%	1	0	3	0	0	0.0%
12,727	95.59%	4.41%	1	3	0	0	0	0.0%
83,940	71.25%	28.75%	1	3	0	0	0	0.0%
156,057	45.68%	54.32%	1	0	3	0	0	0.0%
178,773	42.88%	57.12%	1	0	3	0	0	0.0%
199,941	43.78%	56.22%	1	0	3	0	0	0.0%
153,242	62.45%	37.55%	1	3	0	0	0	0.0%
108,185	74.70%	25.30%	1	4	0	0	0	0.0%
144,098	67.02%	32.98%	1	4	0	0	0	0.0%
253,835	45.97%	54.03%	1	0	3	0	0	0.0%
401,900	36.58%	63.42%	1	0	4	0	0	0.0%
397,977	39.33%	60.67%	2	0	5	0	0	0.0%
308,934	55.83%	44.17%	1	4	0	0	3	75.0%
271,469	60.86%	39.14%	1	4	0	0	0	0.0%
313,254	58.30%	41.70%	2	5	0	0	1	20.0%
451,750	41.87%	58.13%	2	0	5	0	0	0.0%
433,719	56.41%	43.59%	2	6	0	0	2	33.3%
710,828	28.37%	71.63%	2	0	6	0	0	0.0%
616,479	40.85%	59.15%	2	0	6	0	0	0.0%
655,917	41.94%	58.06%	2	0	6	0	0	0.0%
672,535	47.20%	52.80%	1	1	5	1	1	16.7%
851,279	36.23%	63.77%	3	0	7	0	0	0.0%
588,699	61.77%	38.23%	3	7	0	0	0	0.0%
684,022	55.96%	44.04%	2	6	0	1	4	66.7%
702,435	59.27%	40.73%	3	7	0	0	1	14.3%
1,034,193	41.46%	58.54%	3	0	8	0	0	0.0%
1,013,517	47.69%	52.31%	1	3	6	2	3	33.3%
1,093,420	44.25%	55.75%	3	0	8	0	0	0.0%

1,194,376	41.78%	58.22%	4	0	9	0	0	0.0%
1,165,887	48.39%	51.61%	1	4	7	2	4	36.4%
1,389,639	42.65%	57.35%	4	1	10	1	1	9.1%
1,109,993	55.75%	44.25%	3	8	1	2	4	44.4%
1,345,558	47.79%	52.21%	1	4	7	2	4	36.4%
892,378	66.32%	33.68%	4	10	0	0	0	0.0%
1,401,253	48.22%	51.78%	1	3	7	2	3	30.0%
1,234,233	56.94%	43.06%	4	10	0	2	4	40.0%
1,317,097	56.52%	43.48%	4	10	0	2	4	40.0%
1,199,288	60.63%	39.37%	5	12	0	0	2	16.7%
1,095,153	64.79%	35.21%	5	11	0	0	0	0.0%
1,370,588	61.98%	38.02%	6	14	0	1	3	21.4%
1,708,692	54.97%	45.03%	3	10	3	2	4	30.8%
1,963,113	49.04%	50.96%	0	7	9	2	4	25.0%
2,136,931	51.97%	48.03%	1	9	6	2	4	26.7%
1,974,861	57.80%	42.20%	5	14	2	2	4	25.0%
1,980,574	61.58%	38.42%	7	18	2	2	4	20.0%
2,496,763	54.51%	45.49%	3	13	5	2	5	27.8%
2,510,313	55.73%	44.27%	3	14	6	2	5	25.0%
2,281,205	67.30%	32.70%	11	26	3	2	4	13.8%
4,333,504	44.99%	55.01%	3	15	23	2	4	10.5%
3,911,411	53.44%	46.56%	2	17	12	2	4	13.8%
4,459,131	64.87%	35.13%	9	37	18	2	4	7.3%

Simulation: National

Percentage
above 50.0% to
Win All Electoral
Votes

Percentage to
Win All Electoral
Votes

Minimum
Percentage
Needed to Win 1
Electoral Vote

Obama Votes,
50%

Romney Votes,
50%

Obama 50%

GOP 50%

1.5%	51.5%	48.5%	64,553	175,695	26.87%	71.18%
1.5%	51.5%	48.5%	261,388	27,063	90.62%	7.43%
1.5%	51.5%	48.5%	193,488	98,449	66.28%	31.77%
1.5%	51.5%	48.5%	116,980	170,336	40.71%	57.33%
1.5%	51.5%	48.5%	118,661	194,329	37.91%	60.14%
1.5%	51.5%	48.5%	138,033	217,616	38.81%	59.24%
1.5%	51.5%	48.5%	234,545	173,523	57.48%	40.57%
1.5%	51.5%	48.5%	298,233	129,440	69.73%	28.32%
1.5%	51.5%	48.5%	271,070	165,811	62.05%	36.00%
1.5%	51.5%	48.5%	192,585	277,182	41.00%	57.05%
1.5%	51.5%	48.5%	200,303	433,395	31.61%	66.44%
3.0%	53.0%	47.0%	225,347	430,577	34.36%	63.69%
1.5%	51.5%	48.5%	355,781	343,698	50.86%	47.19%
1.5%	51.5%	48.5%	387,642	305,940	55.89%	42.16%
3.0%	53.0%	47.0%	400,538	350,585	53.33%	44.72%
3.0%	53.0%	47.0%	286,771	490,374	36.90%	61.15%
3.0%	53.0%	47.0%	511,773	483,167	51.44%	46.61%
3.0%	53.0%	47.0%	232,262	760,151	23.40%	74.65%
3.0%	53.0%	47.0%	373,879	668,274	35.88%	62.17%
3.0%	53.0%	47.0%	417,653	712,064	36.97%	61.08%
3.0%	53.0%	47.0%	537,857	735,838	42.23%	55.82%
4.5%	54.5%	45.5%	417,250	917,622	31.26%	66.79%
4.5%	54.5%	45.5%	874,771	665,237	56.80%	41.25%
3.0%	53.0%	47.0%	791,947	761,214	50.99%	47.06%
4.5%	54.5%	45.5%	936,512	788,151	54.30%	43.75%
4.5%	54.5%	45.5%	644,569	1,121,991	36.49%	61.56%
6.0%	56.0%	44.0%	827,771	1,109,815	42.72%	55.33%
4.5%	54.5%	45.5%	770,501	1,190,902	39.28%	58.77%

6.0%	56.0%	44.0%	755,279	1,296,342	36.81%	61.24%
7.5%	57.5%	42.5%	980,732	1,278,154	43.42%	54.63%
7.5%	57.5%	42.5%	912,975	1,510,064	37.68%	60.37%
6.0%	56.0%	44.0%	1,273,688	1,234,657	50.78%	47.27%
7.5%	57.5%	42.5%	1,103,505	1,473,642	42.82%	55.23%
6.0%	56.0%	44.0%	1,625,645	1,024,068	61.35%	36.70%
6.0%	56.0%	44.0%	1,170,483	1,535,753	43.25%	54.80%
6.0%	56.0%	44.0%	1,489,699	1,376,693	51.97%	46.08%
6.0%	56.0%	44.0%	1,561,315	1,467,636	51.55%	46.50%
7.5%	57.5%	42.5%	1,695,388	1,350,678	55.66%	42.39%
7.5%	57.5%	42.5%	1,860,490	1,249,731	59.82%	38.23%
9.0%	59.0%	41.0%	2,055,584	1,549,775	57.01%	41.04%
9.0%	59.0%	41.0%	1,897,071	1,897,271	50.00%	48.05%
10.5%	60.5%	39.5%	1,697,932	2,154,583	44.07%	53.98%
10.5%	60.5%	39.5%	2,090,750	2,358,036	47.00%	51.05%
10.5%	60.5%	39.5%	2,472,376	2,207,449	52.83%	45.22%
13.5%	63.5%	36.5%	2,917,964	2,236,764	56.61%	41.44%
12.0%	62.0%	38.0%	2,719,573	2,769,573	49.54%	48.51%
13.5%	63.5%	36.5%	2,878,561	2,792,147	50.76%	47.29%
21.0%	71.0%	29.0%	4,348,442	2,627,931	62.33%	35.72%
27.0%	77.0%	23.0%	3,152,928	4,725,039	40.02%	58.03%
21.0%	71.0%	29.0%	4,072,252	4,328,951	48.47%	49.58%
40.5%	90.5%	9.5%	7,604,208	5,090,035	59.90%	38.15%

Tie in 2-party vote (shift of 2% from D to R)

Electoral votes for each 1.5% over 50.0%	Total electoral votes for winner	Total electoral votes for loser	Democrats' Electoral Votes	GOP Electoral Votes	How many votes would D lose and R win?
105	412	126	267	271	20
1	3	0	0	3	0
1	3	0	3	0	0
1	3	0	3	0	0
1	3	0	0	3	0
1	3	0	0	3	0
1	3	0	0	3	0
1	3	0	3	0	0
1	4	0	4	0	0
1	4	0	4	0	0
1	3	0	0	3	0
1	4	0	0	4	0
2	5	0	0	5	0
0	3	1	3	1	1
1	4	0	4	0	0
2	5	0	5	0	0
2	5	0	0	5	0
0	4	2	4	2	2
2	6	0	0	6	0
2	6	0	0	6	0
2	6	0	0	6	0
2	6	0	0	6	0
3	7	0	0	7	0
3	7	0	7	0	0
0	4	2	4	2	1
2	6	1	6	1	1
3	8	0	0	8	0
3	8	1	1	8	0
3	8	0	0	8	0

4	9	0	0	9	0
3	9	2	2	9	0
5	11	0	0	11	0
0	5	4	5	4	1
3	9	2	2	9	0
4	10	0	10	0	0
3	9	1	1	9	0
1	7	3	7	3	1
1	7	3	7	3	1
3	10	2	10	2	2
5	11	0	11	0	0
4	12	2	12	2	1
0	7	6	7	6	1
2	11	5	5	11	0
0	8	7	7	8	0
1	10	6	10	6	2
4	15	5	15	5	1
0	10	8	10	8	1
0	11	9	11	9	1
8	23	6	23	6	1
5	25	13	13	25	0
0	15	14	14	15	1
6	34	21	34	21	1

Simulation: Romney 52%, Obama 48% Nationwide (shift of 4% from D to R)

Obama Votes, 48%	Romney Votes, 52%	Obama 48%	GOP 52%	Actual electoral votes for each 1.5% over 50.0%	Democrats' Electoral Votes	GOP Electoral Votes	How many votes would D lose and R win?
				111	223	315	64
59,847	180,401	24.91%	75.09%	1	0	3	0
255,737	32,714	88.66%	11.34%	1	3	0	0
187,769	104,168	64.32%	35.68%	1	3	0	0
111,351	175,965	38.76%	61.24%	1	0	3	0
112,530	200,460	35.95%	64.05%	1	0	3	0
131,066	224,583	36.85%	63.15%	1	0	3	0
226,551	181,517	55.52%	44.48%	1	3	0	0
289,855	137,818	67.77%	32.23%	1	4	0	0
262,512	174,369	60.09%	39.91%	1	4	0	0
183,382	286,385	39.04%	60.96%	1	0	3	0
187,889	445,809	29.65%	70.35%	1	0	4	0
212,498	443,426	32.40%	67.60%	2	0	5	0
342,078	357,401	48.90%	51.10%	0	1	3	3
374,055	319,527	53.93%	46.07%	1	4	0	0
385,823	365,300	51.37%	48.63%	0	3	2	2
271,547	505,598	34.94%	65.06%	2	0	5	0
492,282	502,658	49.48%	50.52%	0	2	4	4
212,821	779,592	21.44%	78.56%	2	0	6	0
353,463	688,690	33.92%	66.08%	2	0	6	0
395,521	734,196	35.01%	64.99%	2	0	6	0
512,906	760,789	40.27%	59.73%	2	0	6	0
391,100	943,772	29.30%	70.70%	3	0	7	0
844,602	695,406	54.84%	45.16%	3	7	0	0
761,520	791,641	49.03%	50.97%	0	2	4	3
902,726	821,937	52.34%	47.66%	1	5	2	2
609,962	1,156,598	34.53%	65.47%	3	0	8	0
789,813	1,147,773	40.76%	59.24%	4	0	9	1
732,077	1,229,326	37.32%	62.68%	3	0	8	0

715,088	1,336,533	34.85%	65.15%	4	0	9	0
936,480	1,322,406	41.46%	58.54%	5	0	11	2
865,508	1,557,531	35.72%	64.28%	5	0	11	0
1,224,549	1,283,796	48.82%	51.18%	0	4	5	2
1,053,019	1,524,128	40.86%	59.14%	5	0	11	2
1,573,737	1,075,976	59.39%	40.61%	4	10	0	0
1,117,468	1,588,768	41.29%	58.71%	4	0	10	1
1,433,546	1,432,846	50.01%	49.99%	0	6	4	2
1,501,978	1,526,973	49.59%	50.41%	0	4	6	4
1,635,716	1,410,350	53.70%	46.30%	2	9	3	3
1,799,560	1,310,661	57.86%	42.14%	5	11	0	0
1,984,955	1,620,404	55.06%	44.94%	3	11	3	2
1,822,740	1,971,602	48.04%	51.96%	1	5	8	3
1,622,462	2,230,053	42.11%	57.89%	5	2	14	3
2,003,598	2,445,188	45.04%	54.96%	3	4	11	3
2,380,699	2,299,126	50.87%	49.13%	0	9	7	3
2,816,983	2,337,745	54.65%	45.35%	3	14	6	2
2,612,040	2,877,106	47.59%	52.41%	1	7	11	4
2,767,472	2,903,236	48.80%	51.20%	0	9	11	3
4,211,775	2,764,598	60.37%	39.63%	6	21	8	3
2,998,599	4,879,368	38.06%	61.94%	7	11	27	2
3,907,673	4,493,530	46.51%	53.49%	2	12	17	3
7,355,528	5,338,715	57.94%	42.06%	5	33	22	2